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Abstract. This work presents a new framework for Privacy-Preserving In-
vestment systems in a distributed model. In this model, independent investors
can transfer funds to independent projects, in the same way as it works on
crowdfunding platforms. The framework protects the investors’ single pay-
ments from being detected (by any other party), only the sums of each in-
vestor’s payments are revealed (e.g to the system). Likewise, the projects’
single incoming payments are concealed and only the final sums of the in-
coming payments for every project are revealed. In this way, no other party
than the investor (not even the system administration) can detect how much
she paid to any single project. Though it is still possible to confidentially
exchange any part of an investment between any pair of investors, such that
market liquidity is unaffected by the system. On top, our framework allows
a privacy-preserving return of a multiple of all the held investments (e.g. in-
terest payments or dividends) to the indivdual investors while still revealing
nothing else than the sum of all returns for every investor. We provide rea-
sonable security guarantees for this framework that are based on common
notions from the Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) literature. As an
instantiation for this framework we present Investcoin. This is a proper combi-
nation of three cryptographic protocols, namely a Private Stream Aggregation
scheme, a Commitment scheme and a Range test and it is usable in connec-
tion with any existing currency. The security of the three protocols is based
on the DDH assumption. Thus, by a composition theorem from the SMPC
literature, the security of the resulting Investcoin protocol is also based on the
DDH assumption. Furthermore, we provide a simple decentralised key gener-
ation protocol for Investcoin that supports dynamic join, dynamic leave and
fault-tolarance of investors and moreover achieves some security guarantees
against malicious investors.
1 Introduction
The promise of performance benefit by using technologies like online-outsourcing and
cloud-computing goes along with the loss of control over individual data. Therefore
the public awareness of data protection increases. We use encryption and privacy
technologies to protect our electronic messages, our consumer behaviour or patient
records. In this work, we put the following question up for discussion: why is there
only minor attention paid to the protection of sensitive financial data in the public?
Indeed the requirement to trust in financial institutes may be an obstacle for the
trade secrecy of companies. On the one hand, transactions on organised markets are
registered by electronic systems, audited and eventually get under the control of the
system administration (e.g. it can refuse a transaction). In some cases this is desired:
e.g. it should be possible to detect a company financing criminal activities. On the
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other hand, we would like to protect the trade secrecy of the companies. In this
sense, there is a transparency/confidentiality trade-off in organised markets, such as
exchange or to some extent also crowdfunding platforms.
In this work we address the problem of providing adequate privacy guarantees to
investors. As observed by Nofer [18], although there is no observable significant ef-
fect concerning ”the impact of privacy violations on the investment amount, (...) one
has to remember that trust influences behavior (...) and privacy issues influences
trust (...) and therefore an indirect influence still exists”. Conversely, this means that
individuals would participate more in investments if their privacy is protcted. As
an effect, the reporting of investors concerning wins and losses (and therefore risks)
becomes more reliable [14,9,3]. As further motivation of our work, the possibility to
circumvent certain regulatories, such as financial sanctions by order of ”repressive”
countries, may be desired. Investors may look for a way to invest in sanctioned com-
panies without being traced by their home country.
Consequently, the objective of this work is to solve privacy issues by concealing par-
ticular investment decisions but offering transparency of ”aggregated” investment
decisions. In this regard we introduce a Distributed Investment Encryption (DIE)
scheme for the aggregation of the investments of a number of different investors fund-
ing different projects on an electronic platform. A DIE scheme maintains market liq-
uidity, i.e. the scheme does not affect the possibility to trade assets among investors.
Its cryptographic security is set through the definition of the Privacy-Preserving In-
vestment (PPI) system. Informally, a PPI system conceals the single payments of
investors from being traced but reveals to the system only the aggregates of the
investors’ payments. Similarly, the projects’ single incoming payments are concealed
and only the final sums of the incoming payments for every project are revealed.
Moreover, a PPI system conceals the single returns (representing interest payments,
coupons or dividends) from every single project to every single investor but reveals
(to the system administration) the aggregated return of every single investor. There-
fore, up to a certain extent, a PPI system simultaneously maintains transparency
(e.g. taxes on the final return of every investor can be raised) and trade secrecy.
As a particular PPI system we present Investcoin, a combination of three crypto-
graphic protocols: a Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) scheme, first introduced by
Shi et al. [23], a (homomorphic) Commitment scheme and a Range test for commited
values, all secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Informally, the
PSA scheme is used for the secure aggregation of funds for every particular project
and the homomorphic Commitment scheme is used for the secure aggregation of all
investments and returns of every particular investor. The Range test ensures that
investments are not negative. We provide a simple secret sharing key generation pro-
tocol for Investcoin, that allows investors to dynamically join, leave or fail during the
protocol execution and prevents investors from some malicious cheating.
Related work. The notion of Commitment schemes (first in [4,6]) is well-established
in the literature. The notion of PSA was introduced in [23]. A PSA scheme is a cryp-
tographic protocol which enables a number of users to individually and securely send
encrypted time-series data to an untrusted aggregator requiring each user to send
exactly one message per time-step. The aggregator is able to decrypt the aggregate
of all data per time-step, but cannot retrieve any further information about the in-
dividual data. In [23] a security definition for PSA and a secure instantiation were
provided. Joye and Libert [15] provided a scheme with a tighter security reduction
and Benhamouda et al. [2] generalised the scheme in [15]. By lowering the security
requirements established in [23], Valovich and Alda` [25] provided general conditions
for the existence of secure PSA schemes, based on key-homomorphic weak PRFs.
Investcoin is not a classical cryptocurrency. It can be thought of as a cryptographic
layer on top of any currency used for investments, similar to what Zerocoin is in-
tended to be for Bitcoin. Bitcoin is the first cryptocurrency, introduced by Satoshi
Nakamoto [17]. Currently it is the cryptocurrency with the largest market capitali-
sation. Bitcoin is as a peer-to-peer payment system where transactions are executed
directly between users without interaction of any intermediate party. The transac-
tions are verified by the users of the network and publicly recorded in a blockchain,
a distributed database. Zerocoin was proposed by Miers et al. [16] as an exten-
sion for Bitcoin (or any other cryptocurrency) providing cryptographic anonymity to
recorded transactions in the blockchain (Bitcoin itself provides only pseudonymity).
This is achieved by the use of a seperate mixing procedure based on Commitment
schemes. Therefore particular transactions cannot be publicly traced back to partic-
ular Bitcoin adresses anymore. This is also the main principle of a PPI system: no
investment in a particular project can be traced back to a particular investor. In this
regard Investcoin has similarities with Zerocoin.
Methods for market regulation through aggregated privacy-preserving risk reporting
were studied by Abbe et al. [1]. They constructed protocols allowing a number of
users to securely compute aggregated risk measures based on summations and inner
products. Flood et al. [12] considered balancing transparency and confidentiality for
financial regulation by investigating cryptographic tools for statistical data privacy.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide the description of our investment model, the basic protocols
underlying Investcoin and their corresponding security definitions.
2.1 Model
As initial situation we consider a network consisting of n investors and λ projects
to be funded by the investors. As an analogy from the real world one can think of
a crowdfunding platform or an exchange system where projects or companies try
to collect funds from various individual investors. Each investor Ni, i “ 1, . . . , n, is
willing to invest the amount xi,j ě 0 to the project Pj , j “ 1, . . . , λ, thus the total
amount invested by Ni is
řλ
j“1 xi,j and the total amount received by project Pj isřn
i“1 xi,j . Moreover, there exists an administration (which may be the administra-
tion of the crowdfunding platform). The investors and the project managements are
not required to trust the administration.
We consider a series of investment rounds. An investment round denotes the moment
when the payments of all participating investors are registered by the administration
of the system. From round to round the values n and λ may change, i.e. investors
and projects may join or leave the network before any round.
After an investment round is over and the time comes to give a return to the investors
(i.e. at maturity), the management of each project Pj publishes some value αj defin-
ing the return for each investor (i.e. an indicator of economic growth, interest yield,
dividend yield or similar). The untrusted system administration (or simply system)
serves as a pool for the distribution of investments to the projects and of returns to
the investors: first, for all i “ 1, . . . , n it collects the total amount
řλ
j“1 xi,j invested
by investor Ni and rearranges the union of the total amounts into the aggregated
investment
řn
i“1 xi,j for project Pj for all j “ 1, . . . , λ; at maturity date, for all
j “ 1, . . . , λ it collects the total returns αj
řn
i“1 xi,j of the projects and rearranges
the union of the total returns into the returns
řλ
j“1 αjxi,j of the investors.
While the investors do not have to trust each other nor the system (i.e. an investor
doesn’t want the others to know her financial data), we consider a honest-but-curious
model where the untrusted system administration tries to compromise investors to
build a coalition. This coalition tries to infer additional information about uncom-
promised investors, but under the constraint of honestly following the investment
protocol. On the other hand, we allow investors that are not part of the coalition,
to execute some malicious behaviour, that we will concretise later. Thereby we have
the following objectives in each investment round:
Security
– Hiding: For all i “ 1, . . . , n the only financial data of investor Ni (if uncom-
promised) known to the system is Ci “
řλ
j“1 xi,j and Ei “
řλ
j“1 αjxi,j . For
all j “ 1, . . . , λ the only financial data of project Pj known to the system is
Xj “
řn
i“1 xi,j and αj . Particularly, the single investments of Ni to P1, . . . , Pλ
should remain concealed.
– Binding: Investors may not announce an incorrect investment, i.e. if Ni has send
xi,j to Pj , then Pj should also receive xi,j from Ni.
– For all i, j it holds that xi,j ě 0, i.e. no investor can ’steal’ money from a project.
Correctness
– For all i, if Ci is the real aggregate of Ni’s investments, then Ci “
řλ
j“1 xi,j , the
system knows Ci and can charge the bank account of Ni with amount Ci.
– For all j, if Xj is the real aggregate of Pj ’s funds, then Xj “
řn
i“1 xi,j , the
system knows Xj and transfers the amount Xj to the bank account of Pj .
– For all i, if Ei is the real aggregate of Ni’s returns, then Ei “
řλ
j“1 αjxi,j , the
system knows Ei and transfers the amount Ei to the bank account of Ni.
– If one of these conditions is violated (e.g. on the purpose of stealing money),
then the injured party should be able to detect this fact and to prove it to the
network latest after the end of the corresponding investment round.
Now we provide the building blocks for a scheme satisfying these objectives.
2.2 Private Stream Aggregation
In this section, we define Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) and provide a security
definition. The notion of PSA was introduced by Shi et al. [23].
The definition of Private Stream Aggregation. A PSA scheme is a protocol
for safe distributed time-series data transfer which enables the receiver (here: the
system administrator) to learn nothing else than the sums
řn
i“1 xi,j for j “ 1, 2, . . .,
where xi,j is the value of the ith participant in (time-)step j and n is the number of
participants (here: investors). Such a scheme needs a key exchange protocol for all
n investors together with the administrator as a precomputation, and requires each
investor to send exactly one message (namely the amount to spend for a particular
project) in each step j “ 1, 2, . . ..
Definition 1 (Private Stream Aggregation [23]) Let κ be a security parame-
ter, D a set and n, λ P N with n “ polypκq and λ “ polypκq. A Private Stream Aggregation
(PSA) scheme Σ “ pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq is defined by three ppt algorithms:
Setup: ppp, T, s0, s1, . . . , snq Ð Setupp1
κq with public parameters pp, T “ tt1, . . . , tλu
and secret keys si for all i “ 1, . . . , n.
PSAEnc: For tj P T and all i “ 1, . . . , n: ci,j Ð PSAEncsiptj , xi,jq for xi,j P D.
PSADec: Compute
řn
i“1 x
1
i,j “ PSADecs0ptj , c1,j , . . . , cn,jq for tj P T and ciphers
c1,j , . . . , cn,j. For all tj P T and x1,j , . . . , xn,j P D the following holds:
PSADecs0ptj ,PSAEncs1ptj , x1,jq, . . . ,PSAEncsnptj , xn,jqq “
nÿ
i“1
xi,j .
The system parameters pp are public and constant for all tj with the implicit
understanding that they are used in Σ. Every investor encrypts her amounts xi,j
with her own secret key si and sends the ciphertext to the administrator. If the
administrator receives the ciphertexts of all investors for some tj , it can compute the
aggregate of the investors’ data using the decryption key s0.
While in [23], the tj P T were considered to be time-steps within a time-series (e.g.
for analysing time-series data of a smart meter), in our work the tj P T are associated
with projects Pj , j “ 1, . . . , λ, to be funded in a particular investment round.
Security of Private Stream Aggregation. Our model allows an attacker to com-
promise investors. It can obtain auxiliary information about the values of investors or
their secret keys. Even then a secure PSA scheme should release no more information
than the aggregates of the uncompromised investors’ values.
Definition 2 (Aggregator Obliviousness [23]) Let κ be a security parameter.
Let T be a ppt adversary for a PSA scheme Σ “ pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq and let
D be a set. We define a security game between a challenger and the adversary T .
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm on input security parameter κ and
returns public parameters pp, public encryption parameters T with |T | “ λ “
polypκq and secret keys s0, s1, . . . , sn. It sends κ, pp, T, s0 to T .
Queries. T is allowed to query pi, tj, xi,jq with i P t1, . . . , nu, tj P T, xi,j P D and
the challenger returns ci,j Ð PSAEncsiptj , xi,jq. Moreover, T is allowed to make
compromise queries i P t1, . . . , nu and the challenger returns si.
Challenge. T chooses U Ď t1, . . . , nu such that no compromise query for i P U was
made and sends U to the challenger. T chooses tj˚ P T such that no encryption
query with tj˚ was made. (If there is no such tj˚ then the challenger simply
aborts.) T queries two different tuples px
r0s
i,j˚
qiPU , px
r1s
i,j˚
qiPU with
ÿ
iPU
x
r0s
i,j˚
“
ÿ
iPU
x
r1s
i,j˚
.
The challenger flips a random bit b ÐR t0, 1u. For all i P U the challenger
returns ci,j˚ Ð PSAEncsiptj˚ , x
rbs
i,j˚
q.
Queries. T is allowed to make the same type of queries as before restricted to
encryption queries with tj ‰ tj˚ and compromise queries for i R U .
Guess. T outputs a guess about b.
The adversary wins the game if it correctly guesses b. A PSA scheme achieves
Aggregator Obliviousness (AO) or is secure if no ppt adversary T has more than
negligible advantage (with respect to the parameter κ) in winning the above game.
Encryption queries are made only for i P U , since knowing the secret key for
all i R U the adversary can encrypt a value autonomously. If encryption queries
in time-step tj˚ were allowed, then no deterministic scheme would be secure. The
adversary T can determine the original data of all i R U , since it knows psiqiRU . Then
T can compute the sum
ř
iPU xi,j “ PSADecs0ptj , c1,j, . . . , cn,jq ´
ř
iRU xi,j of the
uncompromised investors’ values. If there is an investor’s cipher which T does not
receive, then it cannot compute the sum for the corresponding tj .
It is also possible to define AO in the non-adaptive model as in [25,24]: here an
adversary may not compromise investors adaptively, but has to specify the coalition
U of compromised investors before making any query.
Feasibility of AO. In the random oracle model we can achieve AO for some con-
structions [23,2,25]. Because of its simplicity and efficient decryption, we use the PSA
scheme proposed in [25] and present it in Figure 1. It achieves AO based on the DDH
assumption.
PSA scheme
Setup: The public parameters are a primes q ą m ¨ n, p “ 2q ` 1 and a hash function H : T Ñ QRp2
modelled as a random oracle. The secret keys are s0, . . . , sn ÐR Zpq with
řn
i“0 si “ 0 mod pq.
PSAEnc: For tj P T and i “ 1, . . . , n, encrypt xi,j P r´m,ms by ci,j Ð p1` p ¨ xi,jq ¨Hptjq
si mod p2.
PSADec: For tj P T and ciphers c1,j, . . . , cn,j compute Vj P t1´ p ¨mn, . . . , 1` p ¨mnu with
Vj ” Hptjq
s0 ¨
nź
i“1
ci,j ”
nź
i“1
p1` p ¨ xi,jq ” 1` p ¨
nÿ
i“1
xi,j mod p
2
and compute
řn
i“1 xi,j “ pVj ´1q{p over the integers (this holds if the ci,j are encryptions of the xi,j).
Fig. 1. PSA scheme secure in the random oracle model.
The scheme proposed in [23] is similar to the one in Figure 1, but is inefficient,
if the range of possible decryption outcomes in is super-polynomially large in the
security parameter. The scheme in Figure 1 also achieves the non-adaptive version
of AO in the standard model.
2.3 Commitment schemes
A Commitment scheme allows a party to publicly commit to a value such that the
value cannot be changed after it has been committed to (binding) and the value itself
stays hidden to other parties until the owner reveals it (hiding). For the basic defini-
tions we refer to [4] and [6]. Here we just recall the Pedersen Commitment introduced
in [19] (Figure 2), which is computationally binding under the dlog assumption and
perfectly hiding. In Section 3 we will combine the Pedersen Commitment with the
PSA scheme from Figure 1 for the construction of Investcoin and thereby consider
the input data x “ xi,j to the Commitment scheme as investment amounts from
investor Ni to project Pj . An essential property for the construction of Investcoin
is that the Pedersen Commitment contains a homomorphic commitment algorithm,
i.e. Compkpx, rq ˚ Compkpx
1, r1q “ Compkpx` x
1, r ` r1q.
2.4 Range test
To allow the honest verifier to verify in advance, that the (possibly malicious) prover
commits to a an integer x in a certain range, a Range test must be applied. Range
Commitment scheme
GenCom: ppp, pkq Ð GenComp1κq, with public parameters pp describing a cyclic group G of order q and pub-
lic key pk “ ph1, h2q for two generators h1, h2 of G. (where dlogh1 ph2q is not known to the commiting
party).
Com: For x P Zq choose r ÐR Zq and compute
com “ Compkpx, rq “ h
x
1 ¨ h
r
2 P G.
Unv: For pk “ ph1, h2q, commitment com and opening px, rq it holds that
Unvpkpcom,x, rq “ 1 ô h
x
1 ¨ h
r
2 “ com.
Fig. 2. The Pedersen Commitment.
tests were studied in [5,7,20,21]. For Investcoin, an interactive proof procedure can be
applied. It is a combination of the Pedersen Commitment to the binary representation
of x and the extended Schnorr proof of knowledge [22] (Figure 3) applied to proving
knowledge of one out of two secrets as described by Cramer [10]. Its basic idea was
described by Boudot [5].
Let W pxq be a set of witnesses for x. We define the following relation.
R “ tpx,wq |x P L,w PW pxqu.
An interactive proof procedure has the following properties. First, it is complete,
meaning that if px,wq P R and the (possibly malicious) prover P knows the witness
w for x, then it is able to convince the honest verifier V (i.e. V honestly follows the
procedure). Second, it is sound, meaning that if px,wq R R, then no ppt algorithm
P is able to convince the honest V except with negligible probability. For a proof
of knowledge, instead of soundness we need special soundness, i.e. there exists a ppt
algorithm that extracts the witness w given a pair of different accepting conversa-
tions on the same input x such that px,wq P R. Thus, no prover without knowledge
of the witness can convince the verifier. Third, for a proof of knowledge, we need the
special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property, meaning that there exists a ppt algo-
rithm that on input x outputs an accepting conversation with the same probability
distribution as the conversations between P and a honest V on input x. Thus, the
verifier is not able to distinguish the witness, if it acts honestly. For the extended
Schnorr proof in Figure 3, completeness, special soundness and special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge hold as can be shown by similar arguments as in [10].
By the interactive procedure from Figure 4, the prover shows to the verifier, that the
commited value x lies in the interval r0, 2l´1s without revealing anything else about
x. For the security of the construction in Figure 3 we refer to [10], where a more gen-
eral protocol was considered (particularly the special honest verifier zero-knowledge
property is needed). We use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [11] to make the Range test
non-interactive.
2.5 Secure Computation
Our security definition for Investcoin will be twofold. In the first part, we consider
a honest-but-curious coalition consisting of the untrusted system administration to-
gether with its compromised investors and the group of honest investors. Here we
refer to notions from Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC). In the second part,
we identify reasonable malicious behaviour that an investor could possibly execute
and show, how the system can be secured against such malicious investors.
In this Section we focus on defining security against the honest-but-curious coalition.
Extended Schnorr Proof of Knowledge
Let G be a cyclic group of order q and h a generator of G. The prover wants to show to the verifier that she
knows the discrete logarithms of either R “ hr or S “ hs without revealing its value and position. W.l.o.g.
the prover knows r.
Com: The prover chooses random v2, w2, z1 ÐR Z
˚
q and sends a1 “ h
z1 , a2 “ h
w2 ¨ S´v2 to the verifier.
Chg: The verifier sends a random v ÐR Z
˚
q to the prover.
Opn: The prover sends v1 “ v ´ v2, w1 “ z1 ` v1r, v2 and w2 to the verifier.
Chk: The verifier verifies that v “ v1 ` v2 and that h
w1 “ a1R
v1 , hw2 “ a2S
v2 .
Fig. 3. Schnorr Proof of Knowledge of one out of two secrets.
Range test
Gen: ppp, pkq Ð Genp1κq, with public parameters pp describing the cyclic group G of order q, a test range
r0, 2l´ 1s Ă G and public key pk “ pg, hq for generators g, h of G (the prover does not know dloggphq).
Com: For x “
řl´1
k“0
xpkq ¨ 2k with xpkq P t0, 1u for all k “ 0, . . . , l ´ 1, the prover chooses random
rpkq, v
pkq
2 , w
pkq
2 , z
pkq
1 ÐR Z
˚
q , k “ 0 . . . , l ´ 1, computes r ”
řl´1
k“0
rpkq ¨ 2k mod q and sends
com “ g
x
¨ h
r
mod q, com
pkq
“g
xpkq
¨ h
rpkq
mod q
a
pkq
1 “h
z
pkq
1
a
pkq
2 “h
w
pkq
2 ¨ ph
rpkq
g
2xpkq´1
q
´v
pkq
2
for k “ 0, . . . , l´ 1 to the verifier.
Chg: The verifier verifies that com ”
śl´1
k“0
pcompkqq2
k
mod q. The verifier sends random vpkq ÐR Z
˚
q for
all k “ 0 . . . , l ´ 1 to the prover.
Opn: The prover sends v
pkq
1 “ v
pkq ´ v
pkq
2 , w
pkq
1 “ z
pkq
1 ` v
pkq
1 r
pkq, v
pkq
2 and w
pkq
2 for all k “ 0 . . . , l ´ 1 to
the verifier.
Chk: For all k “ 0 . . . , l´ 1, the verifier verifies that vpkq “ v
pkq
1 ` v
pkq
2 and that either
ph
w
pkq
1 , h
w
pkq
2 q “ pa
pkq
1 pcom
pkqq
v
pkq
1 , a
pkq
2 pcom
pkq ¨ g´1q
v
pkq
2 q or
ph
w
pkq
1 , h
w
pkq
2 q “ pa
pkq
1 pcom
pkq ¨ g´1q
v
pkq
1 , a
pkq
2 pcom
pkqq
v
pkq
2 q.
Fig. 4. Range test for a commited value.
Definition 3 Let κ be a security parameter and n, λ P N with n “ polypκq. Let
ρ be a protocol executed by a group of size u ď n and a coalition of honest-but-
curious adversaries of size n ´ u ` 1 for computing the deterministic functionality
fρ. The protocol ρ performs a secure computation (or securely computes fρ), if there
exists a ppt algorithm S, such that tSp1κ, y, fρpx, yqqux,y,κ «c tview
ρpx, y, κqux,y,κ,
where viewρpx, y, κq “ py, r,mq is the view of the coalition during the execution of the
protocol ρ on input px, yq, x is the input of the group, y is the input of the coalition,
r is its random tape and m is its vector of received messages.
This definition follows standard notions from SMPC (as in [13]) and is adapted
to our environment: first, we consider two-party protocols where each party consists
of multiple individuals (each individual in a party has the same goals) and second,
we do not consider security of the coalition against the group, since the system
administration has no input and thus its security against honest-but-curious investors
is trivial. Rather we will later consider its security against malicious investors.
Since Investcoin is the combination of various protocols, we will prove the security
of these protocols separately and then use the composition theorem by Canetti [8].
Theorem 1 (Composition Theorem in the Honest-but-Curious Model [8])
Let κ be a security parameter and let m “ polypκq. Let pi be a protocol that computes
a functionality fpi by making calls to a trusted party computing the functionalities
f1, . . . , fm. Let ρ1, . . . , ρm be protocols computing the functionalities f1, . . . , fm re-
spectively. Denote by piρ1,...,ρm the protocol pi, where the calls to a trusted party are
replaced by executions of ρ1, . . . , ρm. If pi, ρ1, . . . , ρm non-adaptively perform secure
computations, then also piρ1,...,ρm non-adaptively performs a secure computation.
3 Investcoin
In this section, we define Distributed Investment Encryption (DIE) and introduce
Investcoin. This protocol is build from a combination of the PSA scheme from Figure
1, the homomorphic Commitment scheme from Figure 2 and the Range test from
Figure 4. Moreover, we provide a simple key-generation protocol for the Investcoin
protocol that allows the dynamic join and leave of investors and is fault-tolerant
towards investors.
3.1 Definition of DIE
A DIE scheme is a SMPC protocol that allows a group of n investors to aggregate
their investments for a set of λ projects in a way that only the sums of the investments
for every single project and the sums of the investments of every single investor are
revealed. In particular, no sum of investments from a set of investors of size smaller
than n to any set of projects is revealed. Additionally, each investor may receive back
a return for her particular investments in a way that only the sum of her returns are
revealed.
Definition 4 (Distributed Investment Encryption) Let κ be a security param-
eter and n, λ P N with n “ polypκq and λ “ polypκq. A Distributed
Investment Encryption (DIE) scheme Ω “ pSetup,DIEEnc,DIECom,DIETes,
DIEUnvPay,DIEDec,DIEUnvRetq is defined by the following ppt algorithms:
Setup: ppp, T, sk0, sk1, . . . , skn, pk1, . . . , pknq Ð Setupp1
κq with public parameters
pp, T “ tt1, . . . , tλu, secret keys sk0, sk1 . . . , skn and public keys pk1, . . . , pkn.
DIEEnc: For all j “ 1, . . . , λ and i “ 1, . . . , n, choose xi,j P D (from some finite
set D parameterised by pp) and compute:
ci,j Ð DIEEncskiptj , xi,jq.
DIECom: For all j “ 1, . . . , λ and i “ 1, . . . , n, choose ri,j Ð UpRq (i.e. a value
chosen uniformly at random from some finite set R parameterised by pp) and
compute
pcomi,j , c˜i,jq Ð DIECompki,skipxi,j , ri,jq.
DIETes: For all j “ 1, . . . , λ and i “ 1, . . . , n: for a public key pki and data value
xi,j , compute
bT,i,j Ð DIETespkipxi,jq, bT,i,j P t0, 1u.
DIEUnvPay: For all i “ 1, . . . , n: for a public commitment key pki, commitment
values comi,1, . . . , comi,λ, a data value Ci and an opening value Di, compute
bP,i Ð DIEUnvPaypki
˜
λź
j“1
comi,j , Ci, Di
¸
, bP,i P t0, 1u.
DIEDec: For all j “ 1, . . . , λ, ciphertexts c1,j, . . . , cn,j, compute
X 1j “ DIEDecsk0ptj , c1,j , . . . , cn,jq.
DIEUnvRet: Generate a public return factor αj for every j P t1, . . . , λu. For all i “
1, . . . , n: for a public commitment key pki, commitment values comi,1, . . . , comi,λ,
a data value Ei and an opening value Fi, compute
bR,i Ð DIEUnvRetpki
˜
λź
j“1
com
αj
i,j , Ei, Fi
¸
, bR,i P t0, 1u.
The system parameters pp are public and constant for all tj P T . Every investor
Ni encrypts her investment amount xi,j for project Pj with the secret key ski in
the DIEEnc algorithm and sends the ciphertext to the system administrator. If the
system administrator receives the ciphertexts from all investors for some tj , it can
compute the sum of the investment amounts for Pj using the decryption key sk0 in the
decryption algorithm DIEDec. After having computed the overall investment amounts
for every project, the system administrator needs to know howmuch each investor has
invested in total in order to collect this total amount from the investor’s bank account.
Each investor Ni claims to the system administrator her total amount Ci invested in
all the projects P1, . . . , Pλ together. In order to prove that Ci “
řλ
j“1 xi,j , Ni sends
a DIE commitment to the system administrator with the DIECom algorithm, where
the commitment value comi,j is generated using the public key and the commitment
cipher c˜i,j is generated using the secret key. The system administrator verifies that
a combination of all commitments of each investor is valid for Ci with the payment
verification algorithm DIEUnvPay. Furthermore, DIETes is executed in order to prove
that the amounts are larger than or equal 0. At maturity, for each j “ 1, . . . , λ, each
investor Ni should receive back a multiple αjxi,j of her amount invested in project
Pj (e.g. a ROI). The factor αj is publicly released by the management of project
Pj and may denote a rate of return, interest or similar. Each investor Ni claims
to the system administrator her total amount Ei to receive back from all projects
P1, . . . , Pλ together. In order to prove that Ei “
řλ
j“1 αjxi,j , for all i “ 1, . . . , n,
the system administrator verifies that a combination of all commitments provided
previously during the commitment phase (see DIECom algorithm) by each investor
together with the corresponding return factors α1, . . . , αλ is valid for Ei with the
return verification algorithm DIEUnvRet.
3.2 Construction of Investcoin
The DIESet algorithm in Figure 5 executes the Setup algorithms of the underlying
schemes. Additionally, DIESet generates a verification parameter βj for each project
Pj (and an additional β0 - this will be used for the security against malicious in-
vestors) which is only known to the system administration. In Section 3.3 we provide
a simple protocol for generating the secrets. The encryption algorithm DIEEnc exe-
cutes the encryption algorithm of Σ and encrypts the amounts invested by Ni into
Pj . In order to prove that Ci “
řλ
j“1 xi,j , the Ni execute the commitment algorithm
DIECom commiting to the amounts xi,j invested using the randomness ri,j by execut-
ing the commitment algorithm of Γ and encrypting the ri,j with Σ. The Range test
algorithm DIETes ensures that the investments are larger or equal 0. The payment
verification algorithm DIEUnvPay first verifies that the combination of the commited
amounts in the correct order is valid for the same combination of amounts encrypted
in the correct order by executing the verification algorithm of Γ . If the investor has
not cheated, this verification will output 1 by the homomorphy of Γ and the fact
that
śλ
j“0Hptjq
βj “
śλ
j“1Hpt˜jq
βj “ 1. The DIEUnvPay algorithm verifies that the
combination of commitments is valid for the aggregate Ci of the investments of Ni.
The decryption algorithm DIEDec then decrypts the aggregated amounts for every
project by executing the decryption algorithm of Σ. After the projects are realised,
each investor Ni should receive back a multiple αjxi,j of her amount invested in
each project Pj (e.g. a ROI). The factor αj is publicly released by the management
of project Pj and denotes a rate of return, interest or similar. This value is equal
for every investor, since only the investor’s stake should determine how much her
profit from that project is. If the first check in the DIEUnvPay algorithm has output
1, the return verification algorithm DIEUnvRet verifies that the combination of com-
mitments and return factors is valid for the claimed aggregate Ei of the returns to
receive by Ni.
We emphasize the low communication effort needed after the DIESet algorithm: every
investor sends the messages for DIEEnc, DIECom, DIETes and DIEUnvPay in one shot
to the system, later only the messages for DIEUnvRet have to be sent. Thus, there
are only two rounds of communication between the investors and the system.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of Investcoin) Let Ω be the protocol in Figure 5. Then
the following properties hold.
1. For all j “ 1, . . . , λ and x1,j , . . . , xn,j P r0,ms:
DIEDecsk0ptj ,DIEEncsk1ptj , x1,jq, . . . ,DIEEncsknptj , xn,jqq “
nÿ
i“1
xi,j .
2. For all i “ 1, . . . , n and xi,1, . . . , xi,λ P r0,ms:
DIEUnvPaypk
˜
λź
j“1
comi,j ,
λÿ
j“1
xi,j ,
λÿ
j“1
ri,j
¸
“ 1
ôD pc˜i,1, . . . , c˜i,λq : pcomi,j , c˜i,jq Ð DIECompk,ski pxi,j , ri,jq @ j “ 1, . . . , λ.
3. For all i “ 1, . . . , n, public return factors α1, . . . , αλ and xi,1, . . . , xi,λ P r0,ms:
DIEUnvRetpk
˜
λź
j“1
com
αj
i,j ,
λÿ
j“1
αjxi,j ,
λÿ
j“1
αjri,j
¸
“ 1
ôD pc˜i,1, . . . , c˜i,λq : pcomi,j , c˜i,jq Ð DIECompk,ski pxi,j , ri,jq @ j “ 1, . . . , λ.
Investcoin
Let κ be a security parameter and n, λ P N with n “ polypκq and λ “ polypκq. Let Σ “ pSetup, PSAEnc, PSADecq be the
PSA scheme from Figure 1 and let Γ “ pGenCom, Com, Unvq be the Commitment scheme from Figure 2. We define Investcoin
Ω “ pDIESet, DIEEnc, DIECom, DIETes, DIEUnvPay, DIEDec, DIEUnvRetq as follows.
DIESet:
– The system administrator generates public parameters pp “ tq, p,Hu with primes q ą m ¨ n, p “ 2q ` 1 (where m “
2l ´ 1 is the maximum possible amount to invest into a single project by an investor, l “ polypκq) and parameters
T “ tt0 , t1, . . . , tλu, T˜ “ tt˜1, . . . , t˜λu.
– The system administrator generates a pair of generators ph1 , h2q P Z
˚
p2
ˆ Z˚
p2
with ordph1q “ ordph2q “ pq, sets the
public key pk “ pT˜ , h1, h2q (which is the same for all investors) and defines a hash function H : T Y T˜ Ñ QRp2
.
– The system administrator and the investors together generate secret keys s0 and
ski “ psi, s˜iq ÐR Zpq ˆ Zpq for all i “ 1, . . . , n with s0 ” ´
řn
i“1
si mod pq.
– The system administrator generates secret parameters β0, . . . , βλ ÐR r´q
1, q1s, q1 ă q{pmλq,
such that
śλ
j“0
Hptj q
βj ”
śλ
j“1
Hpt˜j q
βj ” 1 mod p2 (see Section 3.3 for the details). It sets
sk0 “ ps0, β0, . . . , βλq.
DIEEnc: For all j “ 1, . . . , λ, each investor Ni chooses xi,j P r0,ms and xi,0 “ 0 and for all j “ 0, . . . , λ, Ni sends the following
ciphertexts to the system administrator:
ci,j Ð DIEEncski
ptj , xi,jq “ PSAEncsi
ptj , xi,jq.
DIECom: For all j “ 1, . . . , λ, each Ni chooses ri,j ÐR r0,ms and sends the following to the system administrator:
pcomi,j , c˜i,jq Ð DIECompk,ski
pxi,j , ri,jq “ pCompkpxi,j , ri,jq, PSAEncs˜i
pt˜j , ri,jqq.
DIETes: For all j “ 1, . . . , λ, the algorithm from Figure 4 on pxi,j , ri,jq in QRp2
is executed between the system administrator
(as verifier) and each investor Ni (as prover) using pk to compute bT,i,j P t0, 1u, where bT,i,j “ 1, if the proof is accepted
and bT,i,j “ 0, if not. Note that there always exists a random representation r
p0q
i,j
, . . . , r
pl´1q
i,j
ÐR r0,ms, such that ri,j ”řl´1
k“0
r
pkq
i,j
¨ 2k mod pq.
DIEUnvPay: The system administrator verifies for each investor Ni with commitment values pcomi,1, c˜i,1q, . . . , pcomi,λ, c˜i,λq and
ciphers ci,1, . . . , ci,λ that
Unvpk
¨
˚˝˚ λź
j“1
com
βj
i,j
, Ai, Bi
˛
‹‹‚“ 1,
where Ai “
ˆˆśλ
j“0
c
βj
i,j
mod p2
˙
´ 1
˙
{p and Bi “
ˆˆśλ
j“1
c˜
βj
i,j
mod p2
˙
´ 1
˙
{p (else it aborts). Then each investor Ni
sends Ci “
řλ
j“0
xi,j and Di “
řλ
j“1
ri,j to the system administrator which computes
bP,i “ DIEUnvPaypk
¨
˚˝˚ λź
j“1
comi,j , Ci,Di
˛
‹‹‚“ Unvpk
¨
˚˝˚ λź
j“1
comi,j , Ci,Di
˛
‹‹‚, bP,i P t0, 1u
and charges the bank account of Ni with the amount Ci, if bP,i “ 1.
DIEDec: For all j “ 0, . . . , λ and ciphertexts c1,j , . . . , cn,j , the system administrator computes
Xj “ DIEDecsk0
ptj , c1,j , . . . , cn,jq “ PSADecs0 ptj , c1,j , . . . , cn,jq
and verifies that X0 “ 0 (else it aborts).
DIEUnvRet: The management of each project Pj publishes a return factor αj P r´q
1, q1s. The system administrator charges the
bank account of the management of each project Pj with the amount αjXj . Each investor Ni sends Ei “
řλ
j“1
αjxi,j
and Fi “
řλ
j“1
αjri,j to the system administrator. If the verification in the DIEUnvPay algorithm has output 1, the system
administrator computes for all i “ 1, . . . , n:
bR,i “ DIEUnvRetpk
¨
˚˝˚ λź
j“1
com
αj
i,j
, Ei, Fi
˛
‹‹‚“ Unvpk
¨
˚˝˚ λź
j“1
com
αj
i,j
, Ei, Fi
˛
‹‹‚, bR,i P t0, 1u
and transfers the amount Ei to the bank account of investor Ni, if bR,i “ 1.
Fig. 5. The Investcoin protocol.
Proof. The first correctness property is given by the correctness of the PSA scheme
from Figure 1. The second and third correctness properties are given by the correct-
ness and the homomorphy of the Commitment scheme from Figure 2. [\
By the first property, the decryption of all ciphers results in the sum of the
amounts they encrypt. So the projects receive the correct investments. By the second
property, the total investment amount of each investor is accepted by the system if
the investor has commited to it. Thus, the investor’s account will be charged with the
correct amount. By the third property, the total return to each investor is accepted
by the system if the investor has commited to the corresponding investment amount
before. Thus, the investor will receive the correct return on investment (ROI).
3.3 Generation of public parameters and secret key generation protocol
In this section, we show how the system sets the random oracle H : T Ñ QRp2
and we provide a decentralised key generation protocol for Investcoin. It supports
dynamic join, dynamic leave and fault-tolarance of investors using one round of
communication between the investors. In the Section 4.2, we will show how to use
the public parameters and the secret key generation protocol for the security of
Investcoin.
Setting the random oracle. Recall that we need to generate public parameters,
a random oracle H : T Ñ QRp2 and secret parameters β0, . . . , βλ ÐR r´q
1, q1s,
q1 ă q{pmλq, such that for t0, . . . , tλ, t˜1, . . . , t˜λ P T the following equation holds.
λź
j“0
Hptjq
βj “
λź
j“1
Hpt˜jq
βj “ 1. (1)
First, for j “ 0, . . . , λ ´ 2, on input tj let Hptjq be random in QRp2 and for
j “ 1, . . . , λ ´ 2, on input t˜j let Hpt˜jq be random in QRp2 . The system chooses
β0, . . . , βλ´2 ÐR r´q
1, q1s, βλ´1 ÐR r´q
1, q1 ´ 1s as part of its secret key (note that
choosing these values according to a different distribution gives no advantage to the
system). Then it computes
pHptλ´1q, Hpt˜λ´1qq “
˜
λ´2ź
j“0
Hptjq
βj ,
λ´2ź
j“1
Hpt˜jq
βj
¸
,
pHptλq, Hpt˜λq, βλq “ pHptλ´1q, Hpt˜λ´1q,´1´ βλ´1q,
instructs each investor Ni to set xi,λ´1 “ xi,λ “ 0 and sets αλ´1 “ αλ “ 1. In this
way Equation (1) is satisfied. The projects Pλ´1, Pλ deteriorate to ’dummy-projects’
(e.g. if any investor decides to set xi,λ ą 0, then the system simply collects Xλ ą 0).
Key generation for PSA within Investcoin. The building block for a key gen-
eration protocol is a n´ 1 out of n secret sharing scheme between the investors and
the system. It is executed before the first investment round in the following way.
For all i “ 1, . . . , n, investor Ni generates uniformly random values si,1, . . . , si,n
from the key space and sends si,i1 to Ni1 for all i
1 “ 1, . . . , n via secure channel.
Accordingly, each investor Ni1 obtains the shares s1,i1 , . . . , sn,i1 . Then each investor
Ni sets the own secret key si “
řn
i1“1 si,i1 and each investor Ni1 sends
řn
i“1 si,i1 to
the system. The system then computes
s0 “ ´
nÿ
i1“1
˜
nÿ
i“1
si,i1
¸
“ ´
nÿ
i“1
˜
nÿ
i1“1
si,i1
¸
“ ´
nÿ
i“1
si.
By the secret sharing property this is a secure key generation protocol in the sense
that only Ni knows si for all i “ 1, . . . , n and only the system knows s0.
For key generation, each investor has to send one message to every other investor
and one message to the system which makes n2 messages for the total network.
As a drawback, note that the key of each single investor is controlled by the other
investors together with the system: for example, if N1, . . . , Nn´1 (maliciously) send
the shares s1,n, . . . , sn´1,n and sn,1, . . . , sn,n´1 to the system, it can compute the
entire key sn of Nn.
Assume that before the start of an arbitrary investment round, new investors want
to join the network or some investors want to leave the network or some investors fail
to send the required ciphers. In order to be able to carry out the protocol execution,
the network can make a key update that requires Opnq messages (rather than Opn2q
messages for a new key setup) using the established secret sharing scheme. Due to
space limitations, we omit the (simple) details.
4 Security of Investcoin
4.1 Definition of security
The administration is honest-but-curious and may compromise investors to build a
coalition for learning the values of uncompromised investors. Investors who are not
in the coalition may try to execute the following (reasonable) malicious behaviour:
1. Use different values for xi,j in DIEEnc and DIECom in order to have a larger profit
than allowed.
2. Invest negative amounts xi,j ă 0 in order to ’steal’ funds from the projects.
3. Use different parameters than generated in the Setup-phase (i.e. send inconsistent
or simply random messages) in order to distort the whole computation.
Definition 5 (Privacy-Preserving Investment system) Let κ be a security pa-
rameter and n, λ P N with n “ polypκq and λ “ polypκq. A DIE scheme Ω “
pDIESet,DIEEnc, DIECom,DIETes,DIEUnvPay,DIEDec,DIEUnvRetq consisting of ppt
algorithms and executed between a group of uncorrupted parties of size u ď n and a
coalition of honest-but-curious adversaries of size n´u`1 is a Privacy-Preserving Investment
(PPI) system, if the following properties hold.
1. Let fΩ be the deterministic functionality computed by Ω. Then Ω performs a
secure computation (according to Definition 3).
2. Ω provides linkage, i.e. for all i “ 1, . . . , n, ski, pki, Ci, Di, Ei, Fi,
T “ tt1, . . . , tλu, pxi,jqj“1,...,λ, pcomi,jqj“1,...,λ, pαjqj“1,...,λ the following holds:
if
ci,j Ð DIEEncskiptj , xi,jq @ j “ 1, . . . , λ
^DIEUnvPaypki
˜
λź
j“1
comi,j , Ci, Di
¸
“ 1
^DIEUnvRetpki
˜
λź
j“1
com
αj
i,j , Ei, Fi
¸
“ 1,
then
Ci “
λÿ
j“1
xi,j ^ Ei “
λÿ
j“1
αjxi,j .
3. For all i “ 1, . . . , n and j “ 1, . . . , λ: DIETespkipxi,jq “ 1 iff xi,j ě 0.
4. For all i “ 1, . . . , n, there is a ppt distinguisher Di, such that the following holds.
For any xi,j , ri,j P r0,ms, let ci,j Ð DIEEncski ptj , xi,jq
and pcomi,j , c˜i,jq Ð DIECompki,skipxi,j , ri,jq for all j “ 1, . . . , λ.
For any x1i,j , r
1
i,j P r0,ms, let c
1
i,j Ð DIEEncskpjq
i
pt1j , x
1
i,jq and
pcom1i,j , c˜
1
i,jq Ð DIECompkpjq
i
,sk
pjq
i
px1i,j , r
1
i,jq, for all j “ 1, . . . , λ, such that
ppk
pjq
i , sk
pjq
i , t
1
jq ‰ ppki, ski, tjq for at least one j P rλs, i.e. at least one entry
of at least one tuple is different. Then
|Pr rDi p1
κ, sk0, ci,1, comi,1, c˜i,1, . . . , ci,λ, comi,λ, c˜i,λq “ 1s
´ Pr
“
Di
`
1κ, sk0, c
1
i,1, com
1
i,1, c˜
1
i,1, . . . , c
1
i,λ, com
1
i,λ, c˜
1
i,λ
˘
“ 1
‰ˇˇ
ě1´ negpκq.
The probability space is defined over the internal randomness of Di.
The definition is twofold: on the one hand it covers the security of honest investors
against a honest-but-curious coalition consisting of the untrusted system administra-
tion and compromised investors (Property 1) and on the other hand it covers the
security of the system against maliciously behaving investors (Properties 2, 3, 4).
Note that we have to distinguish between these two requirements, since we assume
different behaviours for the two groups of participants, i.e. we cannot simply give
a real-world-ideal-world security proof as in the SMPC literature in the malicious
model. Instead, we follow the notions of the SMPC literature [13] for the security
of honest investors (only) in the honest-but-curious model and additionally provide
security notions against some reasonably assumable behaviour of malicious investors.
For the security against a honest-but-curious coalition, the first property ensures that
from the outcome of the decryption no other information than Xj can be detected for
all j “ 1, . . . , λ and that the single amounts comitted to by the investors for payment
and return are hidden. For the security of the system against maliciously behaving
investors, imagine the situation where an investor Ni claims to having payed amount
xi,j to project Pj (in the DIECom algorithm) but in fact has only payed x˜i,j ă xi,j
(in the DIEEnc algorithm). If the return factor αj is larger than 1, then Ni would
unjustly profit more from her investment than she actually should and the system
would have a financial damage.1 Therefore the second property says that for all
i “ 1, . . . , n with overwhelming probability, whenever xi,1, . . . , xi,λ were send by Ni
using the DIEEnc algorithm and DIEUnvPay, DIEUnvRet accept Ci, Ei respectively,
then Ci and Ei must be the legitimate amounts that Ni respectively has invested
in total and has to get back as return in total. The third property ensures that no
investor is able to perform a negative investment. The fourth property ensures that
all investors use the correct parameters as generated by the DIESet algorithm.2
1 Usually the investor cannot know if αj ą 1 at the time of cheating, since it becomes
public in the future. However, in the scenario where a priori information about αj is
known to some investors or where investors simply act maliciously, we need to protect
the system from beeing cheated.
2 More precisely, it ensures that a cheating investor will be identified by the system.
4.2 Proof of security
First, we concentrate on the security against the honest-but-curious coalition (Prop-
erty 1) and then show security against malicious investors (Propertis 2, 3, 4).
Theorem 3 By the DDH assumption in the group QRp2 of quadratic residues mod-
ulo p2 for a safe prime p, Investcoin is a PPI system in the random oracle model.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 below.
[\
Security against honest-but-curious coalition. Investcoin is the combination of
the protocols described in Figures 1, 2, 3.3 We first show the security of the underlying
protocols seperately and then use Theorem 1 in order to show composition. In this
section, assume without loss of generality that the indices i “ 1, . . . , u belong to the
group of uncorrupted investors and the indices i “ u`1, . . . , n belong to the investors
corrupted by the system administrator. Before showing security, we briefly explain
the functionalities used in the proofs. In the following, computations are performed
modulo p2.
– The functionality fΣ is computed by the protocol in Figure 1. It takes as input
n values x1, . . . , xn and outputs their sum
fΣpx1, . . . , xnq “
nÿ
i“1
xi.
– The functionality fΓ is computed by the protocol in Figure 2. It takes as input
three values com, x, r and outputs b “ 1 iff px, rq is a valid opening for the
commitment com, else b “ 0.
– The functionality fΥ is computed by the protocol in Figure 3. It takes as input
the values r,R and outputs b “ 1 iff r is a discrete logarithm of either R or
S “ R ¨ g´1 with base h, else b “ 0.
– For β “ pβ0, . . . , βλq, the functionality fβ is computed by the DIEUnvPay algo-
rithm in Figure 5 (using β0, . . . , βλ and pci,j , c˜i,jq for all i “ 1, . . . , n, j “ 1, . . . , λ
generated by DIEEnc,DIECom respectively). It takes as input the values x0,
x1, r1, . . . , xλ, rλ and outputs A “
řλ
j“0 βjxj and B “
řλ
j“1 βjrj .
Lemma 4 Under the DDH assumption, the protocol Σ in Figure 1 securely computes
the functionality fΣ in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume the coalition is corrupted. Let txi,j : i “ 1, . . . , n, j “ 1, . . . , λu be
the input messages of all investors. We construct a simulator S for the
viewΣppxi,jqi“1,...,n,j“1,...,λ, κq “ ppxi,jqi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ,K, pci,jqi“1,...,u,j“1,...,λq
of the coaltion, where ci,j “ PSAEncsiptj , xi,jq for all i, j and
PSAEncs0ptj , 0q ¨
ś
i ci,j “ 1` p ¨ fΣppxi,jqi“1,...,nq mod p
2 for all j, as follows.4
3 The Range test in Figure 4 is the combination of the protocols in Figure 2 and 3. Therefore
it suffices to show the security of these protocols.
4 There is no internal randomness of the coalition. Instead the common public randomness
from the random oracle H is used.
S takes as input 1κ, messages pxi,jqi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ and the protocol outputs
pXjqj“1,...,λ “ pfΣppxi,jqi“1,...,nqqj“1,...,λ.
1. Choose messages px1i,jqi“1,...,u,j“1,...,λ with each x
1
i,j P r0, 2
l ´ 1s, such that
for all j “ 1, . . . , λ:
uÿ
i“1
x1i,j “ Xj ´
nÿ
i“u`1
xi,j .
2. Compute c1i,j “ PSAEncsiptj , x
1
i,jq for i “ 1, . . . , u and
ci,j “ PSAEncsiptj , xi,jq for i “ u ` 1, . . . , n, j “ 1, . . . , λ for the keys
s1, . . . , sn ÐR Zpq with s0 ” ´
řn
i“1 si mod pq.
S outputs pxi,jqi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ,K, pc
1
i,jqi“1,...,u,j“1,...,λ.
The computational indistinguishability of the output distribution of S from 
viewΣppxi,jqi“1,...,n,j“1,...,λ, κq
(
pxi,jqi“1,...,n,j“1,...,λ,κ
immediately follows from the AO1
security of Σ, which holds by the DDH assumption. [\
Lemma 5 The protocol Υ in Figure 3 securely computes the accepting functionality5
fΥ .
Proof. Assume the honest verifier is corrupted and the prover knows the discrete
logarithm of either R or S “ R ¨ g´1 base h, where g, h, are public. We construct a
simulator S for the
viewΥ pt, R, S, κq “ pR,S, v, a1, a2, pv1, w1q, pv2, w2qq
of the verifier, such that v “ v1 ` v2 and h
w1 “ a1R
v1 , hw2 “ a2S
v2 and t is the
input of the prover, as follows.
S takes as input 1κ, the verifier’s input pR,Sq and the protocol output b “ 1.
1. Choose random values v11, v
1
2, w
1
1, w
1
2 ÐR Zq .
2. Set v1 “ v11 ` v
1
2.
3. Set a11 “ h
w11R´v
1
1 and a12 “ h
w12S´v
1
2 .
S outputs R,S, v1, a11, a
1
2, pv
1
1, w
1
1q, pv
1
2, w
1
2q.
The value v1 is random, since v11, v
1
2 are random. Then the distribution of the output
of S is indistinguishable from
 
viewΥ pt, R, S, κq
(
t,R,S,κ
by the special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge property of Υ , which holds perfectly. [\
Lemma 6 Under the DDH assumption, the algorithms DIEEnc, DIECom and
DIEUnvPay securely compute the functionality fβ in the random oracle model.
Proof. In order to compute Ai “
řλ
j“0 βjxi,j and Bi “
řλ
j“1 βjri,j , the algo-
rithm DIEUnvPay (executed by the system administrator) takes as input the values
β0, . . . , βλ and the encryptions ci,j , c˜i,j of xi,j , ri,j respectively generated by the algo-
rithms DIEEnc and DIECom (executed by investor Ni) for j “ p0q, 1, . . . , λ. Since the
encryptions ci,j , c˜i,j are both generated by the protocol Σ in Figure 1, the statement
follows from the AO1 security of Σ as in the proof of Lemma 4. [\
Lemma 7 Under the DDH assumption, Investcoin satisfies Property 1 of Definition
5 in the random oracle model.
5 I.e. the case b “ 1. In the case b “ 0, by the completeness property, the prover has tried
to convince the verifier about a wrong statement. Thus, we can assume that the prover
was intending some malicious behaviour. In this case, we do not care about preserving
the privacy of this prover.
Proof. Let ΩfΣ ,fΥ ,fβ be the protocol Ω, where executions of the aforementioned pro-
tocols are replaced by calls to a trusted party computing the according functionalities
fΣ , fΥ , fβ.
6 Assume the coalition is corrupted. We first describe ΩfΣ ,fΥ ,fβ . Thereby
we assume that the key generation in DIESet is completed as a pre-computation. The
other algorithms work as follows.
– For all j “ 0, . . . , λ, the input pxi,jqi“1,...,u of the uncorrupted group of investors
and the input pxi,jqi“u`1,...,n of the coalition is sent to the trusted party which
returns Xj “
řn
i“1 xi,j “ fΣpx1,j , . . . , xn,jq to the system administrator. The
system administrator verifies that X0 “ 0, otherwise it aborts.
– For all i “ 1, . . . , u, j “ 1, . . . , λ, investor Ni chooses ri,j ÐR r0,ms and sends
comi,j “ Compkpxi,j , ri,jq to the system administrator (where Com is as in Figure
2).
– For all i “ 1, . . . , u, j “ 1, . . . , λ, k “ 0, . . . , l ´ 1, investor Ni chooses
x
pkq
i,j P t0, 1u, r
pkq
i,j ÐR r0,ms with xi,j ”
řl´1
k“0 x
pkq
i,j ¨ 2
k mod pq and
ri,j ”
řl´1
k“0 r
pkq
i,j ¨ 2
k mod pq and sends com
pkq
i,j “ Compkpx
pkq
i,j , r
pkq
i,j q to the system
administrator. The system administrator verifies that
comi,j ”
śl´1
k“0pcom
pkq
i,j q
2k mod p2 for all i, j and sends the com
pkq
i,j to the trusted
party. Moreover, the investors send the x
pkq
i,j , r
pkq
i,j to the trusted party which re-
turns
fΥ pr
pkq
i,j , com
pkq
i,j q “ bT,i,j,k
for all i “ 1, . . . , u, j “ 1, . . . , λ, k “ 0, . . . , l ´ 1 to the system administrator.
– For i “ 1, . . . , u, investor Ni sends xi,j , ri,j , j “ 1, . . . , λ to the trusted party
and the system administrator sends β “ pβ0, . . . , βλq to the trusted party which
returns
pAi, Biq “
˜
λÿ
j“1
βjxi,j ,
λÿ
j“1
βjri,j
¸
“ fβp0, xi,1, ri,1, . . . , xi,λ, ri,λq
for all i “ 1, . . . , u to the system administrator which verifies that
Unvpk
˜
λź
j“1
com
βj
i,j , Ai, Bi
¸
“ 1.
Then the uncorrupted investors Ni, i “ 1, . . . , u, send Ci “
řλ
j“0 xi,j and Di “řλ
j“1 ri,j to the system administrator which computes
bP,i “ Unvpk
˜
λź
j“1
comi,j , Ci, Di
¸
, bP,i P t0, 1u.
– The uncorrupted investors Ni, i “ 1, . . . , u, send Ei “
řλ
j“0 αjxi,j and Fi “řλ
j“1 αjri,j to the system administrator which computes
bR,i “ Unvpk
˜
λź
j“1
com
αj
i,j , Ei, Fi
¸
, bR,i P t0, 1u.
6 The system administrator, which is part of the coalition, and the investors simply feed
the trusted party with their according inputs, outputs and received messages to compute
the respective functionalities. Since we deal with modular sequential composition, the
trusted party cannot be invoked to compute the functionalities simultaneously. Rather a
functionality is executed after the output of the previous functionality was distributed to
the parties.
This is exactly the protocol in Figure 5 where sub-protocols are exchanged by
calls to a trusted party computing the ideal functionalities fΣ , fΥ , fβ and the sys-
tem administrator knows all secret values of the corrupted investors. We show that
ΩfΣ ,fΥ ,fβ performs a secure computation. In the following, we construct a simulator
S for the viewΩ
fΣ,fΥ ,fβ
ppxi,jqi“1,...,n,j“0,...,λ, κq “ py, r,mq of the coaltion with
y “ppxi,jqi“u`1,...,n,j“0,...,λ, px
pkq
i,j qi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ,k“0,...,l´1q,
r “ppri,jqi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ, pr
pkq
i,j qi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ,k“0,...,l´1q,
m “ppcomi,jqi“1,...,u,j“1,...,λ, pcom
pkq
i,j qi“1,...,u,j“1,...,λ,k“0,...,l´1, pCi, Di, Ei, Fiqi“1,...,uq.
S takes as input 1κ, y and the protocol outputs Xj for j “ 0, . . . , λ,
tbT,i,j,k “ 1 : i “ 1, . . . , u, j “ 1, . . . , λ, k “ 0, . . . , l ´ 1u, Ai, Bi for i “ 1, . . . , u.
1. For i “ 1, . . . , u, j “ 1, . . . , λ, set x1i,0 “ 0 and choose x
1
i,j P r0, 2
l ´ 1s, such
that
řu
i“1 x
1
i,j “ Xj ´
řn
i“u`1 xi,j for all j “ 1, . . . , λ,
řλ
j“1 βjx
1
i,j “ Ai for all
i “ 1, . . . , u. Choose px1
p0q
i,j , . . . , x
1pl´1q
i,j q with x
1
i,j ”
řl´1
k“0 x
1pkq
i,j ¨ 2
k mod pq for all
i “ 1, . . . , u, j “ 1, . . . , λ.
2. For i “ 1, . . . , n, j “ 1, . . . , λ, choose r1i,j ÐR r0, 2
l ´ 1s and pr1
p0q
i,j , . . . , r
1pl´1q
i,j q
with r1i,j ”
řl´1
k“0 r
1pkq
i,j ¨ 2
k mod pq and
řλ
j“1 βjr
1
i,j “ Bi for all i “ 1, . . . , n,
j “ 1, . . . , λ.
3. Compute com1i,j “ Compkpx
1
i,j , r
1
i,jq and com
1pkq
i,j “ Compkpx
1pkq
i,j , r
1pkq
i,j q for all i “
1, . . . , u, j “ 1, . . . , λ, k “ 0, . . . , l ´ 1.
4. For i “ 1, . . . , u, compute C 1i “
řλ
j“1 x
1
i,j , D
1
i “
řλ
j“1 r
1
i,j , E
1
i “
řλ
j“1 αjx
1
i,j ,
F 1i “
řλ
j“1 αjr
1
i,j .
S outputs py1, r1,m1q with
y1 “ppx1i,jqi“u`1,...,n,j“0,...,λ, px
1pkq
i,j qi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ,k“0,...,l´1q,
r1 “ppr1i,jqi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ, pr
1pkq
i,j qi“u`1,...,n,j“1,...,λ,k“0,...,l´1q,
m1 “ppcom1i,jqi“1,...,u,j“1,...,λ, pcom
1pkq
i,j qi“1,...,u,j“1,...,λ,k“0,...,l´1, pC
1
i, D
1
i, E
1
i, F
1
i qi“1,...,uq
and the output of S is indistinguishable from the view of the coalition by the perfect
hiding property of Γ . The statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 4, Lemma
5, Lemma 6, and Theorem 1. [\
Security against malicious investors.
Lemma 8 Under the dlog assumption, Investcoin satisfies Property 2 of Definition
5 with overwhelming probability in the random oracle model.
Proof. For any i P rns, assume that ci,j Ð DIEEncskiptj , xi,jq for all j “ 1, . . . , λ,
DIEUnvPaypk
´śλ
j“1 comi,j , Ci, Di
¯
“ 1, DIEUnvRetpk
´śλ
j“1 com
αj
i,j , Ei, Fi
¯
“ 1.
Then by the rules of the protocol also Unvpk
´śλ
j“1 com
βj
i,j , Ai, Bi
¯
“ 1 for some
β0, . . . , βλ P r´q
1, q1s (unknown to Ni) with q
1 ă q{pmλq, where we have defined
Ai “
˜˜
λź
j“0
c
βj
i,j mod p
2
¸
´ 1
¸
{p and Bi “
˜˜
λź
j“1
c˜
βj
i,j mod p
2
¸
´ 1
¸
{p
with ci,j ” p1` p ¨ xi,jq ¨Hptjq
si mod p2 and c˜i,j ” p1` p ¨ ri,jq ¨Hpt˜jq
s˜i mod p2 for
all j “ 1, . . . , λ and for a random oracle H : T Y T˜ Ñ QRp2 . Now assume that either
Ci ‰
řλ
j“1 xi,j or Ei ‰
řλ
j“1 αjxi,j . Then by the homomorphy and computational
binding of the Pedersen commitment scheme Γ , which holds by the dlog assumption,
there is at least one j1 P rλs, such that comi,j1 is not the commitment of xi,j1 but of
some x1i,j1 ‰ xi,j1 . We define the mapping
fβ0,...,βλ : r0,ms
λ Ñ r´q, qs, fβ0,...,βλpx0, . . . , xλq “
λÿ
j“0
βjxj .
Then, by Equation (1), fβ0,...,βλpxi,0, . . . , xi,λq “ Ai. Moreover, fβ0,...,βλ is not ef-
ficiently computable by Ni, since it does not know β0, . . . , βλ P r´q
1, q1s, if q1 is
super-polynomial in κ (from Equation (1), Ni can compute the βj only with negli-
gible probability, since H is a random oracle). Therefore with overwhelming prob-
ability, for any choice of px1i,0, . . . , x
1
i,λq by Ni, such that comi,j is valid for x
1
i,j for
all j “ 1, . . . , λ, the equation fβ0,...,βλpx
1
i,0, . . . , x
1
i,λq “ Ai is only true, if x
1
i,j “ xi,j
for all j “ 0, . . . , λ. This is a contradiction to the existence of at least one j1 with
x1i,j1 ‰ xi,j1 . By the binding of Γ , the case fβ0,...,βλpx
1
i,0, . . . , x
1
i,λq ‰ Ai is a contra-
diction to Unvpk
´śλ
j“1 com
βj
i,j , Ai, Bi
¯
“ 1. [\
Lemma 9 Under the dlog assumption, Investcoin satisfies Property 3 of Definition
5 with overwhelming probability.
Proof. We have to show that for all i “ 1, . . . , n, j “ 1, . . . , λ and pk “ ph1, h2q, with
overwhelming probabilty, DIETespkpxi,jq “ 1 iff xi,j ě 0. The Range test in Figure 4
performs l times the protocol from Figure 3. I.e. for every bit x
pkq
i,j of xi,j , the Range
test performs an Extended Schnorr protocol (Figure 3) for proving the knowledge
of 1 out of 2 secrets: either the prover knows the opening p0, r
pkq
i,j q to the Pedersen
commitment com
pkq
i,j “ h
r
pkq
i,j
2 or the opening p1, r
pkq
i,j q to com
pkq
i,j “ h1 ¨ h
r
pkq
i,j
2 , where
k “ 0, . . . , l´ 1.
Since the Pedersen Commitment is homomorphic, the commitment comi,j for xi,j is
congruent
śl´1
k“0pcom
pkq
i,j q
2k . Then the direction “ð” immediately follows from the
completeness property of the protocol in Figure 3.
Assume a malicious prover tries to prove that some commited value
xi,j R r0, 2
l ´ 1s is in r0, 2l ´ 1s. Then there exists at least one k1 ě l such that
xi,j “ x
pk1q
i,j ¨ 2
k1 `
řl´1
k“0 x
pkq
i,j ¨ 2
k with x
pk1q
i,j , x
pkq
i,j P t0, 1u for all k “ 0, . . . , l´ 1 (since
we reduce modulo pq). Since the verifier has to receive commitments to exactly l bits,
the prover needs to know the discrete logarithm of at least one h
r
pk2q
i,j
2 or h1 ¨ h
r
pk2q
i,j
2
which is not among com
pkq
i,j , k “ 0, . . . , l´ 1, k
1. The prover can compute it only with
negligible probability by the dlog assumption. Thus, the direction “ñ” follows from
the special soundness of the protocol from Figure 3. [\
Lemma 10 Under the dlog assumption, Investcoin satisfies Property 4 of Definition
5 with overwhelming probability in the random oracle model.
Proof. Let T “ tt1, . . . , tλu be the set of public parameters used for encryption and
let pk be the public key for the commitment. For all i P rns, such that investor Ni
is not in the coalition with the system administrator, i.e. i P U , let ski be the secret
key of investor Ni. We construct Di as follows. On input
1κ, sk0, ci,0, c
˚
i,1, com
˚
i,1, c˜
˚
i,1, . . . , c
˚
i,λ, com
˚
i,λ, c˜
˚
i,λ,
it has to decide whether pc˚i,j , com
˚
i,j , c˜
˚
i,jq “ pci,j , comi,j , c˜i,jq for all j “ 1, . . . , λ or
pc˚i,j , com
˚
i,j , c˜
˚
i,jq “ pc
1
i,j , com
1
i,j , c˜
1
i,jq for all j “ 1 . . . , λ, where
ci,j Ð PSAEncsiptj , xi,jq, comi,j Ð Compkpxi,j , ri,jq, c˜i,j Ð PSAEncs˜ipt˜j , ri,jq, c
1
i,j Ð
PSAEnc
s
pjq
i
pt1j , x
1
i,jq, com
1
i,j Ð Compkpjq px
1
i,j , r
1
i,jq, c˜
1
i,j Ð PSAEncs˜pjq
i
pt˜1j , r
1
i,jq for all
j “ 1, . . . , λ, s.t. ppkpjq, s
pjq
i , s˜
pjq
i , t
1
j, t˜
1
jq ‰ ppk, si, s˜i, tj , t˜jq for at least one j P rλs, i.e.
there is a difference in at least one entry for at least one tuple. Di uses its input to
compute
Ai “
˜˜
c
β0
i,0 ¨
λź
j“1
c˚
βj
i,j mod p
2
¸
´ 1
¸
{p and
Bi “
˜˜
λź
j“1
c˜˚
βj
i,j mod p
2
¸
´ 1
¸
{p.
Then it computes and outputs b “ Unvpk
´śλ
j“1 com
˚βj
i,j , Ai, Bi
¯
. For the first case,
i.e. if pc˚i,j , com
˚
i,j , c˜
˚
i,jq “ pci,j , comi,j , c˜i,jq for all j “ 1, . . . , λ, we have b “ 1 by
construction. We have to show that in the second case, i.e. if pc˚i,j , com
˚
i,j , c˜
˚
i,jq “
pc1i,j , com
1
i,j , c˜
1
i,jq for all j “ 1 . . . , λ, with overwhelming probability b “ 0. Thus, Di
will distinguish the cases on its input.
As a pre-computation, based on the key generation protocol from Section 3.3, for all
i1 “ 1, . . . , n, investor Ni1 has published
Ti,i1 “ PSAEncsi,i1 pt0, 0q
on a black board for all the key shares s1,i1 , . . . , sn,i1 received during the key genera-
tion and the system administrator has verified that
PSADec´
ř
n
i“1 si,i1
pt0, T1,i1 , . . . , Tn,i1q “ 0,
i.e. all verifications are true (if not, the system aborts and the process is repeated
with all but the excluded cheating investors) as described above. Thus,
ci,0 “ PSAEncsipt0, 0q “
nź
i1“1
Ti,i1
is fixed, i.e. ci,0 is generated with the correct parameters from the first case. Now con-
sider the second case, where pc˚i,j , com
˚
i,j , c˜
˚
i,jq “ pc
1
i,j , com
1
i,j , c˜
1
i,jq for all j “ 1 . . . , λ.
Recall that the system administrator’s secret values β0, . . . , βλ are not efficiently
computable by the investors (who do not collaborate with the system administra-
tor). Assume b “ 1. Then
hAi1 h
Bi
2 “
λź
j“1
com˚
βj
i,j ,
where ph1, h2q is the public key for the Pedersen commitment which is used for
verification by the system administrator in both cases. By the computational binding
of the Pedersen commitment, which holds under the dlog assumption, Ni must have
known Ai, Bi for computing a valid commitment
śλ
j“1 com
˚βj
i,j (note that in the first
case, this is not necessary, since all ciphers and commitments were generated with
consistent parameters). This is not possible, except with negligible probability, since
from Ni’s point of view, β0, . . . , βλ are unknown. [\
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A Preservation of Market liquidity
We show that it is still possible to privately exchange any part of an investment
between any pair of investors within Investcoin, i.e. market liquidity is unaffected.
Assume that an investment round is over but the returns are not yet executed, i.e. the
system administrator already received ci,j , pcomi,j , c˜i,jq, Ci, Di for all i “ 1, . . . , n and
j “ 1, . . . , λ, but not Ei, Fi. Assume further that for some i, i
1 P t1, . . . , nu, investors
Ni and Ni1 confidentially agree on a transfer of amount xpi,i1q,j (i.e. a part of Ni’s
investment in project Pj) from investor Ni to investor Ni1 . This fact needs to be
confirmed by the protocol in order to guarantee the correct returns from project Pj
to investors Ni and Ni1 . Therefore the commitments to the invested amounts xi,j
and xi1,j respectively need to be updated. For the update, Ni and Ni1 agree on a
value rpi,i1q,j ÐR r0,ms via secure channel. This value should be known only to Ni
and Ni1 . Then Ni and Ni1 respectively compute
com1i,j Ð Compkpxpi,i1q,j, rpi,i1q,jq,
com1i1,j Ð Compkpxpi,i1q,j, rpi,i1q,jq
and send their commitments to the system administrator which verifies that com1i,j “
com1i1,j. Then the system administrator updates
comi,j by comi,j ¨ pcom
1
i,jq
´1,
which is possible since the Com algorithm is injective, and
comi1,j by comi1,j ¨ com
1
i1,j.
As desired, the updated values commit to xi,j ´ xpi,i1q,j and to xi1,j ` xpi,i1q,j respec-
tively. Moreover, Ni updates the return values pEi, Fiq by
pEi ´ αj ¨ xpi,i1q,j , Fi ´ αj ¨ rpi,i1q,jq
and Ni1 updates pEi1 , Fi1q by
pEi1 ` αj ¨ xpi,i1q,j, Fi1 ` αj ¨ rpi,i1q,jq.
The correctness of the update is guaranteed by Property 2 and the confidentiality of
the amount xpi,i1q,j (i.e. only Ni and Ni1 know xpi,i1q,j) is guaranteed by Property 1
of Definition 5 which are satisfied by Lemma 8 and Lemma 7 respectively.
Note that in general, this procedure allows a short sale for Ni when xpi,i1q,j ą xi,j
or for Ni1 when xpi,i1q,j ă 0 and |xpi,i1q,j| ą xi1,j (over the integers). If this behaviour
is not desired, it may also be necessary to perform a Range test for the updated
commitments comi,j ¨ pcom
1
i,jq
´1 (between the system administrator and Ni) and
comi1,j ¨ com
1
i1,j (between the system administrator and Ni1) to ensure that they still
commit to amounts ě 0.
